Statement on the occasion of the IAEA Board of Governors
on behalf of the Republic of Estonia by H.E. Ambassador Arti Hilpus
Vienna, 17-21 November 2025
Agenda item: NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Distinguished Chair,
Estonia fully aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, delivered by Denmark. I would like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.
We thank the Director General and his team for the report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Estonia reiterates its support to the NPT and underlines the essential role of the Agency’s system of safeguards
in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Chair,
In the report, the Director General notes that Iran has not engaged the Agency
during this reporting period on the unresolved safeguards issues. At the same time the Director General has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement safeguards activities in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement – which remains in force – and that its implementation cannot be suspended
under any circumstances. Under the Agreement, Iran is required to provide a special report without delay on the status for safeguards purposes of the nuclear material and facilities affected by the military attacks, but it has not done so. Iran is also not implementing the provisions of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information
for new facilities.
Iran’s continued disregard for its safeguards obligations alongside its repeated lack of meaningful cooperation with the IAEA has seriously affected the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran. Because of this, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including low and highly enriched uranium. The fact that the IAEA has not had access to verify Iran´s inventory of High-Enriched Uranium for over five months means that its verification according to standard safeguards practice is long overdue. Without the full implementation of safeguards in Iran being resumed, the Agency will not be in a position to provide any conclusion or assurance regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
Chair,
Iran began reducing the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA in May 2019, and in February 2021 stopped implementing them altogether. Despite all diplomatic efforts to fully restore the JCPOA, Iran has significantly departed from its nuclear-related commitments. Not only has Iran gained irreversible knowledge, but it has also produced nuclear material in quantities and enrichment levels far exceeding the limits agreed under the JCPOA. Iran’s continuously escalating nuclear trajectory over the last five years has also increased the risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region.
The snap-back of sanctions and nuclear restrictions is not the end of diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue, as it remains a key challenge to regional and international security. We therefore call on Iran to urgently engage in diplomatic efforts in good faith.
Estonia supports the Agency’s efforts to implement its mandate and thanks the Director General and his team for their professional, objective and impartial work in their interactions with Iran. We encourage the Director General to monitor the situation and continue to provide further updates as appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.